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Quantum cryptography1, 2 holds the promise to establish an information-theoretically se-
cure global network3. All field tests of metropolitan-scale quantum networks4–7 to date are
based on trusted relays. The security critically relies on the accountability of the trusted re-
lays, which will break down if the relay is dishonest or compromised. Here, we construct a
measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDIQKD)8 network in a star
topology over a 200 square kilometers metropolitan area, which is secure against untrust-
ful relays and against all detection attacks. In the field test, our system continuously runs
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through one week with a secure key rate ten times larger than previous result9. Our results
demonstrate that the MDIQKD network, combining the best of both worlds — security and
practicality, constitutes an appealing solution to secure metropolitan communications.
Quantum key distribution (QKD)1, 2 can in principle offer information-theoretical security
between two remote parties, guaranteed by the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics. The
last three decades have witnessed tremendous advances in both theoretical developments and suc-
cessful experimental demonstrations of various quantum cryptographic systems. Moreover, QKD
networks of various topologies have emerged and extended to more users in larger domains4–7, 10.
To increase the scalability of these networks, the architectures often adopt the idea of sharing,
and thus star-type network is preferable for sharing the most expensive resource — single photon
detectors10, as shown in Fig. 1(a). With such a topological structure, it is straightforward to directly
add more users with low hardware requirement.
From the security point of view, the existing star-type networks have to assume the central
relays to be trustful, which is a critical shortcoming. Once the relay is dishonest, the security of
the whole network is down. Furthermore, an honest relay with imperfect devices still suffers from
various attacks that exploit the loopholes caused by the gap between the idealized devices assumed
in the security proof and the realistic ones11. Indeed, single photon detectors can be difficult
for legitimate users to characterize precisely but easy for technology-advanced eavesdroppers to
exploit a certain imperfection to attack12, 13. It is important to note that in all previous network
implementations, trustful relays are utilized, which constitutes the weakest point of security.
2
Remarkably, the MDIQKD protocol8, inspired by the time-reversed entanglement-based
QKD protocol14–16, can close all the detection loopholes. Besides, MDIQKD is intrinsically suit-
able for a star-type network architecture with measurement devices placed at the central relay, as
depicted in Fig. 1(b). Since its security doesn’t rely on any assumption on measurement, MDIQKD
network even allows the eavesdroppers to have a full control of the relay without compromising
the security. Therefore, the MDIQKD networks are able to solve the security loophole existing in
the conventional star-like QKD networks and almost all existing quantum networks.
Up till now, many efforts have been devoted to proof-of-principle experimental demonstra-
tions of the MDIQKD protocol17–21. Further experiments, accounting for long distance, high loss
and field test, have also been reported9, 22, 23. Nevertheless, these are all limited to point-to-point
configurations. A network implementation, yet to be developed, is crucial for enabling and extend-
ing practical applications of MDIQKD.
Here, we experimentally demonstrate a three-user, four-node MDIQKD network within the
city of Hefei, China. The network deployment is shown in Fig. 2(a), which includes an untrusted
relay, R, and three users, U1, U2, and U3, located in four different places. The deployed fiber
lengths (channel losses) between the three users and the relay are 17 km (5.1 dB), 25 km (9.2
dB), and 30 km (8.1 dB), respectively. We employ an 8-by-4 mechanical optical switch to route
the three users to the relay by auto-control command, with a low connection loss around 1 dB
per channel. The outputs of the switch are connected to a fiber beam splitter (BS) for Bell state
measurement (BSM). Within the star-type topology, any user pair (U1− U2, U1−U3, U3−U2)
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can get access to the BSM setup to run MDIQKD, which works as a quantum telephone exchange.
We emphasize that the MDIQKD network is not a straightforward upgrade of the previ-
ous point-to-point system18, 22. There are significant new technical challenges in the network im-
plementation. The first one is reference frame calibration. Due to the polarization and phase
fluctuation17, 18, the reference frame needs to be calibrated timely. In the previous point-to-point
experiments18, 22, we utilized an additional fiber link between the two users and one phase-stabilization
laser (PSL) for this purpose. To scale up for networking applications, the demand of fiber links
increases quadratically with the user number. Besides, each new user needs an additional PSL with
its wavelength locked to the signal laser.
We use a scalable and efficient structure of phase stabilization suitable for phase calibration.
As shown in Fig. 3(a), a pulsed PSL is placed in the relay and passes through a reference asymmet-
rical Mach-Zehnder interferometer (AMZI) with a delay of 6.5 ns. It is divided by BS and then
sent to the three users through three additional fibers, respectively. After the user’s AMZI, two
commercial power meters record the two output interference intensities. Their measurement ratio
provides a feedback signal to compensate the phase shift of AMZI by the phase shifter inside each
user’s AMZI. In this arrangement, the required fiber resources increase only linearly with the user
number, which is a significant reduction compared to that in point-to-point structure. In addition,
only one PSL, placed in the relay and shared by all the users, is needed.
The other critical challenge is to maintain the indistinguishability of all the users’ lasers. For
a point-to-point system, a high-speed feedback system22 was developed for this purpose where the
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two lasers are calibrated and locked via a feedback loop. Whereas, in the network, any two users
will be switched upon their requests. Once switched, the two lasers must be calibrated immediately
to guarantee their timing, spectrum and polarization mode are indistinguishable. Furthermore, the
optical switch will change the lasers’ arriving time and polarization when it is connected.
In our network, we randomly switch any two users to the relay BSM per two hours, i.e.
we need to recalibrate all the lasers’ modes per two hours. For the timing synchronization and
polarization stabilization, we adopt the feedback system in our previous system22 (see Methods).
For the wavelength calibration, in the point-to-point system, we previously utilized an optical
spectrum analyzer (OSA) to calibrate and feedback the wavelength. Here, we measure the Hong-
Ou-Mandel (HOM) interference with the BSM setup and utilize the visibility of the HOM dip as
the feedback signal. When the time and polarization are calibrated, the HOM visibility depends
on the wavelength difference of the two lasers. And then we adjust the wavelength by tuning
the temperature of the input signal lasers. As shown in the inset of Fig. 3(b), by scanning the
wavelength, we can observe a clear HOM dip. Using this method, we can take advantage of the
existing BSM equipments, without the need of other instruments sush as the OSA. Furthermore,
as the HOM dip can reflect the overall interference condition, it is also an efficient way to calibrate
all the interference parameters, including the wavelength difference.
In our experiment, we optimize the system parameters24, including the decoy-state parameter
and basis choice setting25, to increase the secure key rate. This optimization is based on the system
parameters of the MDIQKD network with a high-quality transmitter system and a high-efficiency
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detection system. The MDIQKD transmitter at the user side and the BSM setup in the relay are
illustrated in Fig. 2(b). Each user has the same configuration, adopting a signal laser internally
modulated at 75 MHz, with a central wavelength of 1550.12 nm and a pulse width of 2.5 ns. With
decoy-state optimization, the laser pulse intensities of vacuum state, weak decoy state and signal
state are 0, ν = 0.1 and µ = 0.33, respectively, and their probabilities are 16%, 58% and 26%,
respectively. Each user employs the time-bin phase-encoding scheme26, in which only the raw data
in the Z basis are used for final key generation and those in the X basis are used for phase error
estimation. All the signal state is encoded in the Z basis. For the weak decoy state, 63% is encoded
in the X basis and the rest 37% in the Z basis. We utilize an AMZI, three AMs (AM2∼AM4) and
one PM to encode qubits. The modulators, AM2, AM3 and PM, are used to encode basis, and
AM4 is used to normalize the two bases’ average photon numbers. The signal laser pulses are
attenuated to single-photon level by an EVOA.
After passing through the deployed fiber routed to the relay by an optical switch, the laser
pulses are interfered in the BSM setup. Before the BSM, we insert two DWDMs with 0.7 dB loss
to block the background light. The BSM is then implemented with an interference BS and two
SNSPDs27 operated at 2.1K with system detection efficiencies of 64% and 66% and the dark count
rate of 100 Hz. The inner insertion loss of the BS is 1.4 dB. The partial BSM post-selects |ψ〉−
Bell state, when the two detectors in the two output arms of the BS have a coincidence detection at
two alternative time bins. We set an efficient time window of 1.7 ns to achieve a good interference.
With the BSM results announced by the untrusted relay, the two users run the basis sift by
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post selecting the raw data when they choose the same basis. Then the two users categorize the
data according to vacuum, decoy and signal state labels and evaluate the gains and bit error rates
in each case. All the data from the Z basis, consisting of nine cases, will be used for secure key
extraction. The secure key rate formula is given by8,
R ≥
∑
a,b∈{0,ν,µ}
Qab
11
[1−H(eab
11
)]−QabfH(Eab), (1)
where 0, ν, µ denote the vacuum, decoy and signal states, respectively. Qab and Eab are the overall
gain and error rate when two users send states a and b with a, b ∈ {0, ν, µ, }. The gain and
phase error rate of the single-photon components, Qab
11
and eab
11
, can be estimated by the decoy-state
method with a proper fluctuation analysis28. H(e) = −e log2(e)− (1− e) log2(1− e) is the binary
Shannon entropy function. The parameter f is the error correction efficiency and we use f = 1.2
for evaluation. The detailed key rate calculation is shown in Supplemental Material.
We run the post-processing for each valid data session of 1 to 2 hours between different user
pairs. In the analysis, we fix the failure probability to be 10−10. The secure key rates between
different pairs, U1 − U2, U1 − U3, and U3 − U2, in different runs are shown in Fig. 4(a). They
are averagely 17.1 bps in 1 hour (U1− U2), 6.4 bps in 1 hour (U1− U3) and 4.2 bps in 1.5 hours
(U3 − U2). Furthermore, we analysis the secure key rate by accumulating all the valid data, and
have extracted 38.8 bps in 17.4 hours (U1 − U2), 29.1 bps in 14.2 hours (U1 − U3) and 16.5 bps
in 26.9 hours (U3 − U2), as shown in Fig. 4(b). We remark that the results we have achieved are
at least ten times higher than the previous state-of-the-art field test.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated the first MDIQKD network which is secure against un-
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trustful replays and all detection attacks, and also resource efficient in real world implementation.
The multi-user HOM interference technology developed in the experiment can find applications
in multi-party entanglement swapping based quantum communication29 and a quantum computing
cloud. In quantum computing cloud, the users only need to prepare quantum states and share the
expensive quantum computing devices. Furthermore, with the decoy state source, such topological
setup can also be extended to the blinding quantum computing30, where the computing station can
be untrusted.
Methods
Fully-automated feedback system. The time calibration system mainly includes synchro-
nization laser (SynL, 1570 nm) pulses to synchronize the whole system, and programmable delay
chip to adjust the time delay of SynL pulses. The polarization stabilization system in each arm of
the interference BS in the BSM handles the polarization misalignment of the laser pulse connected
to BSM by the optical switch. It mainly includes an EPC, a PBS, a SNSPD in the reflection port
of this PBS, and a polarization-maintained interference BS in the transmission port.
For the wavelength calibration, we implement the HOM interference and calculate the coin-
cidence value of HOM dip, rather than measure the wavelength difference directly by an OSA. The
coincidence value of HOM dip is calculated by (NcNtot)/(N1N2), where Nc, Ntot, N1 and N2 rep-
resent the coincidence count of two BSM detectors, the total pulse count sent by the laser source,
the detection count of BSM detector 1 and 2, respectively, over a certain run time and within a
certain time window. By scanning the temperature which increases linearly with the wavelength
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of our laser (0.8 pm per 0.01 degree centigrade), we can obtain the optimized wavelength. To im-
plement HOM dip measurement, the two users send their strong laser pulses without any decoy or
qubit modulation. Besides, it’s preferable for the intensity of the laser pulses arriving at the BSM
setup to be close to each other. This is because the coincidence value represents the indispensabil-
ity considering all the modes. To obtain the wavelength difference more precisely, the coincidence
value should be less influenced by the other aspects. To fulfill this purpose, the EVOA in the user’s
side is utilized to adjust the output intensity in this wavelength calibration procedure.
For the phase stabilization, we adopt a pulsed PSL (1550.12 nm) with 2.5 ns pulse width
placed in the relay. It passes through an AMZI with 6.5 ns time difference of two paths. Then, a
BS divides the pulsed laser into three parts, with each output port connecting to one user. Com-
bined with the synchronization laser pulses by WDM, The PSL pulses are transmitted through an
additional fiber links and received by the corresponding user. Separated by another WDM, the PSL
pulses passes through the user’s AMZI, and are monitored by two commercial power meters in the
two interference output. The intensity ratio provides a feedback signal to calibrate two AMZIs’
phase reference frame by the phase shifter inside each user’s AMZI. This arrangement has two
advantages in both the scalable structure and the low commercial cost. Firstly, this new structure
is preferred for extension, with only one PSL placed in the relay and shared by all the users. In
contrast, the structure of phase stabilization system suitable for point-to-point implementation22
needs one more feedback laser source when one user joins in the network, and all the feedback
laser wavelengths should be locked to the signal laser, which increases the technical complexity.
Secondly, we adopt the commercial power meter rather than the gated single-photon detector. On
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one hand, the power meter is much cheaper, especially preferred by users. On the other hand, the
single-photon detector requires a gate signal with time calibrated according to fiber length shift.
However, the power meter requires no extra controlling signal and thence no calibration to it.
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Figure 1: (a) Schematic of conventional QKD network with detectors as the shared resources
which are vulnerable to detection attacks. (b) Schematic of star-type MDIQKD network, in which
the shared detectors can be even controlled by Eve, but without any leakage of key information.
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Figure 2: Birds-eye view of the MDIQKD network topology. User U1 is placed in an admin-
istrative committee (AC) (N31◦47′5′′ , E117◦12′58′′), user U2 in the site of Animation Industry
Park in Hefei (AIP) (N31◦50′6′′, E117◦7′52′′), and user U3 in the site of an office building (OB)
(N31◦50
′
57
′′
, E117◦16
′
50
′′
). Besides, a central relay R placed in the campus of University of
Science and Technology of China (USTC) (N31◦50′8′′, E117◦15′47′′), is shared by all the users.
The users’ setup and the relay’s BSM setup are shown in the inset. In the user’s side, we utilize
an internally modulated signal laser, and modulate the decoy intensity according to vacuum+weak
decoy scheme by an AM. Then we adopt a circulator, an asymmetrical Mach-Zehnder interferom-
eter (AMZI), three amplitude modulators (AMs) and one phase modulator (PM) to encode qubits.
The idle ports of circulators and beam splitters for the AMZI are exploited for phase synchro-
nization and feedback, which are represented in the dash line. After attenuated by an electrical
variable optical attenuator (EVOA), the signal laser pulses are sent via the deployed fiber to the
relay comprised by an interference BS and two superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors
(SNSPDs). Before the BSM, we adopt a dense wavelength division multiplexor (DWDM) in each
input of the BS to block the stray light in the fiber, and insert an electric polarization controller
(EPC) and a polarization beam splitter (PBS) for polarization alignment.
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Figure 3: (a) The structure of phase-feedback scheme. A PSL placed in the relay passes through
a reference AMZI with 6.5 ns delay and a circulator. It is divided into three parts by BS and then
sent to each user’s AMZI connected by an additional fiber, respectively. After the user’s AMZI,
two photon detectors (here we use commercial power meters) record the two output interference
intensities, and then provide a feedback signal to compensate the phase shift of AMZI by the phase
shifter inside each user’s AMZI. (b) The wavelength calibration result via measuring HOM inter-
ference. The different vertical zone represents different runs of MDIQKD. The X axis represents
the system running time, and the Y axis represents the temperature for U2’s laser in the case of
user pair (U3 − U2). Every green circle and red square point defines optimized temperature after
a HOM dip measurement and the start temperature of each run. The inset shows the experimental
HOM dip curve we measure by scanning the temperature.
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Figure 4: (a) the secure key rate array of each run with a valid time of 1.0 ∼ 1.3 hours for user
pair (U1 − U2), 0.8 ∼ 1.2 hours for (U1 − U3) and 1.2 ∼ 2.1 hours for (U3 − U2). (b) the
overall key rate (unit: bps) with accumulated data of each user pair in 17.4 hours (U1 − U2), 14.2
hours (U1 − U3) and 26.9 hours (U3 − U2). (c) the system parameters, including the loss, the
accumulation time and secure key rate obtained.
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